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THE ROLE OF CORPORATE LAW IN THE
ADAPTATION OF FRENCH ENTERPRISES
James A. Fanto"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Article addresses the role of corporate law' in the
adaptation of French enterprises. It argues that the law has
been, and will continue to be, important in the adaptation,
although it attempts not to overstate the law's significance
This role of French corporate law makes sense only in
relation to the financial and economic circumstances of
French business.
The Article has the following theoretical and normative
assumptions. First, economic circumstances as broadly
defined (e.g., availability and distribution of resources,
technology, methods of capital-raising, transaction costs)
largely influence business enterprise structure. Businesses
that adapt to the circumstances have the best chances of
Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. The author would like to
thank Dean Joan Wexler of Brooklyn Law School for a summer stipend
that enabled him to complete this Article. This article is based on earlier
drafts presented at the Cross-Border Conference on Corporate
Governance sponsored by the Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at
Columbia Law School, at a conference sponsored by the Association
dtconomie Financi~re on Workable Corporate Governance: Cross-Border
Perspectives, and at the 14th Annual Conference of the European
Association of Law & Economics. The author would also like to thank the
participants of these conferences, as well as Professors Arthur Pinto,
Norman Poser, Spencer Waller of Brooklyn Law School, for their
comments and suggestions. © 1998 James Fanto.
' French corporate law and securities law are not separate areas, but
are part of the same legal code. All references to French corporate law
are to CODE DES SOCIPT2S (Paul Le Cannu ed., 13th ed. Petits Codes
Dalloz 1996) (Fr.).
2 See also JAMES A. FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND
FRENCH LAW (1997); James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in
French Corporate Governance, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 1997).
3 See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 14-46 (1990).
surviving. Second, the law of business associations, which
establishes the legal relationships between principals and
agents in enterprises (i.e., corporate governance), should
help businesses in their adaptive efforts and should resolve
most efficiently (i.e., provide the lowest cost solutions for)
the inevitable problems arising in these relationships.5 A
discussion of French corporate law should thus present the
economic circumstances facing that country's businesses,
the businesses' responses to the circumstances and the
law's contribution to the adaptive responses.
A third set of assumptions is that individuals are value
maximizers and remarkably adaptive to circumstances,6 but
adaptation is not automatic, and individual and social
constraints may hinder it and produce human conflict.
Individuals may not know that change has occurred, and,
even if they perceive it, they may not know whether the
change is temporary or permanent and how they should
respond to it. 7 Business people, lawyers and legal scholars
also have collective or "cultural"8 ways of seeing and
understanding phenomena and motivating their actions.
'See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 308-10 (1976).
5 Law and corporate governance are only several among many factors
of concern to firms in their adaptation. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE xi (1994). Yet law, like any other constraint on or
facilitator of business, matters to firms. See Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate
Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 334, 345 (1996); RAFAEL LA PORTA, ET AL., LAW AND
FINANCE 40 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
5661, 1996) (suggesting that law helps determine the financial structure
of a country's firms).
'See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man,
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1994, at 4, 5-6.
7 See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARv. L. REV. 641, 650, 652 n. 21 (1996) (describing the rationality of
resistance to change). See also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS
OF GOVERNANCE 36 (1996) (describing "bounded rationality").
' See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTz, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES:
SELECTED ESSAYS 89 (1973).
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There are thus social constraints on adaptation.9 Because of
individual and cultural perspectives, people may resist the
need for change and the rise of others better suited to
respond to it. New economic circumstances can thus bring
about human conflict and the inevitable demise of some and
the triumph of others.'0 An explanation of the role of French
corporate law in French enterprise adaptation should begin
to address such issues.
On the basis of these assumptions, the Article proceeds
as follows. Part II presents French enterprises as
responding , to post-war economic and business
circumstances under the oversight of the French State and
argues that French corporate law took on a Statist
character to contribute to this response. Part III suggests
that the economic and political circumstances facing France
during the past two decades have changed and require an
enterprise adaptation that is generally incompatible with
the Statist approach. It argues that this adaptation has
begun, but that continuing State influence on enterprises,
family ownership of firms and management opportunism in
the new environment threaten a market capitalism that is
important in the firm adaptive process.
Part IV argues that, during the same two decades,
French legal policy-makers modified French corporate law,
particularly securities law, to help enterprises adapt to the
new economic circumstances by creating a basic legal
environment conducive to market capitalism. It observes
that such reforms are only the first step, for the more
difficult task is to address the above impediments to capital
market investing. Finally, Part V explains how a recent
' See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 6, at 10 (pointing out that the
social exists in a dialectic with the individual and does not dictate
individual decision-making).
"0 See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit,
and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 847-50
(1993). Cf., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 15-29 (1996).
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proposal, the Marini Report," is an important contribution
to discussion about reform to French corporate law since it
advocates eliminating the law's Statist legacy and
contributing to enterprise adaptation by facilitating market
capitalism., The Part shows, through a few examples
dealing with the board of directors, how the Report, while
valuable, does not adequately address the obstacles to this
capitalism.
II. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN THE FRENCH
ECONOMY AND CORPORATE LAW
This Part briefly identifies the path that French
business and the law have already followed and an
important cultural feature influencing that path. It limits
its historical account essentially to the three decades of the
post-war years ("Les Trente Annges Glorieuses"), a story
familiar to French economic and business historians. 2
After 1945, France rebuilt a war-devastated country and
transformed its primarily rural economy into a modern
industrial one. 3  France met this challenge with
" See PHILIPPE MARINI, RAPPORT AU PREMIER MINISTRE SUR LA
MODERNISATION DU DROIT DES SOCIPTtS (13 juillet 1996) (hereinafter, the
"Marini Report"). See also CONSEIL NATIONAL Du PATRONAT FRANQAIS,
ASSOCIATION FRANAISE DES ENTREPRISES PRIVAES, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF LISTED COMPANIES IN FRANCE (July 10, 1995) (hereinafter,
the "Vinot Report" (named after Marc Vi6not, the chairman of the
committee that drafted the report and chief executive of the French
bank, Societ6 GT&6rale)).
12 See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES ADAMS, RESTRUCTURING THE FRENCH
ECONOMY: GOVERNMENT AND THE RISE OF MARKET COMPETITION SINCE
WORLD WAR II 4-7 (1989); JEAN-FRANQOIS ECK, HISTOIRE DE L'ECONOMIE
FRANQAISE DEPUIS 1945 4-39 (1992); RICHARD F. KUISEL, CAPITALISM AND
THE STATE IN MODERN FRANCE: RENOVATION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 187-271 (1981).
13 See Maurice L6vy-Leboyer, The Large Corporation in Modern
France, in MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
RISE OF THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 117-160 (Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr. & Herman Daems eds., 1980) (explaining that the typical
modern, vertically-integrated firm producing consumer-oriented or
technologically sophisticated goods, with numerous product lines and a
[Vol. 1998COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
CORPORATE LAWAND FRENCH ENTERPRISES
considerable success, achieving a rate of growth during this
period that eventually surpassed those of its European
partners and creating businesses that successfully
competed in international markets. State involvement and
influence in the economy and State ownership and control
of many large French enterprises characterized this
period.14 The State's role was partly due to the general post-
war discrediting of French industrial and financial elites
because of their collaboration during the Vichy period. 5 The
State economic involvement or "dirigisme" also had a
cultural explanation, for, since at least the seventeenth
century, large French economic undertakings have received
aid from the State and State-formed elites. 6 State
ownership and control efficiently solved enterprise
financing in the post-war years: since investors,
traumatized by pre-war market volatility and wartime
losses, were reluctant to participate directly in the capital
of large enterprises and in the stock market, the State acted
as the necessary financial intermediary. During this time,
the State owned, directly or indirectly, major industrial and
financial businesses and even exercised considerable
influence over the policies of non-State-owned enterprises. 7
This economic environment and the Statist response
pushed French corporate law down a path that furthered
State intervention in business enterprises; a "Statist"
coordination among operating divisions, appeared in France only after
World War II).
" See generally ADAMS, supra note 12, at 257-59 (describing the
significance of major French enterprises in the French economy during
this period); James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate
Governance and United States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 1, 28-40 (1995) (describing the evolution of State control and
ownership).
5 See generally ALAIN BELTRAN & PASCAL GRISET, L'tCONOMIE
FRANQAiSE 1914-1945 24-25 (1994).
'6 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, WORLD ECONOMIC PRIMACY: 1500 TO
1990 110 (1996).
17 See ECK, supra note 12, at 13-14. See also Fanto, supra note 14, at
33 n.93 (presents statistics on State ownership of enterprises); Andrea
Goldstein, Privatizations and Corporate Governance in France, BNL Q.
REV., Dec. 1996, at 455, 458 (presenting more recent statistics).
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corporate law contributed to the State's post-war
involvement in large firms.18 An example from the major
1966 codification of French corporate law makes the point. 9
Commentators often observe that a typical French chief
executive exercises nearly royal or emperor-like powers
over an enterprise and generally receives little supervision
from (and pays little attention to) the board of directors or
shareholders, except in an extreme crisis.0 While this
power is certainly due to the expertise and informational
'8 Cf, LA PORTA, supra note 5, at 19-20, 34-35 (concluding that
corporate law in France and in countries following the French legal
tradition does not provide much legal protection to investors and that
ownership of corporations in such countries is thus concentrated, for
large owners are better able to control management in these
circumstances); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 769-70 (1996) (finding corporate
governance systems to have different combinations of concentrated
ownership and legal protections for shareholders). During the post-war
years, the State had many ways of controlling enterprises remaining in
stock company form (i.e., the socigtd anonyme). See generally JEAN
KERNINON, LES CADRES JURIDIQUES DE L'PCONOMIE MIXTE 73-81 (1992)
(describing State's authority to select a controlling majority of the
members of the board of directors and the chief executive and to conduct
inspections). The State also selected managers and directors with a State
educational and professional background that made them sympathetic to
State enterprise goals. See id., at 80. See generally MICHEL BAUER, LES
200: COMMENT DEVIENT-ON UN GRAND PATRON? 123-197 (1987)
(describing traditional State career path to executive positions).
'9 Since French corporate law, unlike U.S. law, is national, rather
than regional, and, as is characteristic of civil law systems, is codified
(rather than part of a common law development), it is particularly
susceptible to State influence. Cf, ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 128-33 (1993).
20 See, e.g., Colin Gordon, The Business Culture in France, in
BUSINESS CULTURES IN EUROPE 58, 99-100 (Collin Randlesome et al. eds.,
1990). French law provides two forms of board structure for the socidtd
anonyme: a board of directors (conseil d'administration) that selects one
of its members as the chairman and chief executive (president directeur
g~ndral or "PDG"), see C. Soc., Loi NO 66-257 du 24 juillet 1966, arts. 89-
117 (Fr.), and a supervisory board (conseil de surveillance), which names
an executive board (le directoire) and selects a president thereof, see C.
Soc., Loi NO 66-257 du 24 juillet 1966, arts. 118-152 (Fr.).
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advantage that are hallmarks of centralized management,21
the PDG also has .a statutory basis for his dominance that
overlaps with the board's authority.22 Since this executive
power, whose origin lay in Vichy France,' supported a firm
governance of hierarchical control, and, to put a positive
spin upon it, of technical expertise, not of deliberation and
oversight, it furthered State ownership when the State
selected management.24
III. CHANGING FRENCH BUSINESS CIRCUMSTANCES
AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Economic and political circumstances facing French
businesses over the last twenty years differ from those of
the post-war years. To use Jensen's characterization,25
industry and finance have been in an ongoing restructuring
since the 1970s (not coincidentally, at the end of Les Trente
Glorieuses). Technological developments, particularly in
communications, permit lower-cost completion of certain
economic tasks and linkages between previously separate
work, all of which produces industrial overcapacity and
obsolescence. The technology also permits a different
2? See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 8-9 (1977).
2 Compare C. SOC., Loi N' 66-257 du 24 juillet 1966, art. 113 (Fr.)
(providing that the PDG has extensive powers to act in any circumstance
on the company's behalf) with art. 98 (stating, in identical language, that
the board has the same power).
23See, e.g., CLAUDE DucouLoux-FAvARD, SoIiTit ANONYME, AKTIEN
GESELLSCHAFT, SOCIETA PER AzIONI 101 (1992). See also Andrd Tunc, Le
gouvernement des socidt~s anonymes: le mouvement de riforme aux Etats-
Unis et au Royaume-Uni, 1 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARt
[R.I.D.C.] 59 (1994) (explaining power as a legal response to the
dysfunctional boards of directors and warring shareholder factions
characteristic of pre-war French capitalism); Olivier PastrY, Les dix
commandements du gouvernement d'entreprise, in RAPPORT MORAL SUR
LIARGENT DANS LE MONDE 1996 201, 204 (1996).
24 This executive power was "over determined" since it is also
compatible with family ownership of large French firms. See infra Part
III.
' See Jensen, supra note 10, at 835-47.
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enterprise organization that replaces elaborate hierarchies
of decision-making with flexible, flatter work environments
that can rapidly respond to product changes and customer
needs." These changes heighten product market
competition, and at the same time, other events, such as
the breakdown of the Socialist block and lessening of
worldwide trade barriers, produce global competition.
The technological changes also provide large firms
different methods of corporate finance. They can raise
financing outside their home market and have access to a
range of financial products designed for their needs and
investor preferences.27  Similarly, investors, whether
individually or through financial intermediaries, have
diverse investment opportunities throughout the world. The
companies best able to take advantage of new capital-
raising opportunities in world capital markets gain a
competitive advantage by having a lower cost of financing
and a more efficient and strategic use of their financiiig
ability.2" A company must then find ways of financing from
capital market investors.29
For various reasons, the State may not and cannot
manage well a firm's adaptation to these new
circumstances." Over the past two decades, therefore, it
28 See "A fortress against change", A Survey of Business in Europe,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1996, at 3-5.
27 See Lawrence J. White, Competition versus Harmonization--An
Overview of International Regulation of Financial Services, in
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: HARMONIZATION VERSUS
COMPETITION 5, 5-6 (Claude E. Barfield ed., 1996); Ingo Walter, Global
Competition and Market Access in the Securities Industry, in
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: HARMONIZATION VERSUS
COMPETITION 84, 84-86 (Claude E. Barfield ed., 1996).
28 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate
Differences: Markets or Law?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1997, at 23,
27.
, Cf Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 18, at 769; Marco Pagano et al.,
Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. Fin. 27, 60-
61 (1998) (observing that competitive world-class companies must use
domestic and global capital markets).
30 See, e.g., John Vickers & Vincent Wright, The Politics of Industrial
Privatisation in Western Europe: An Overview, in THE POLITICS OF
[Vol. 1998
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progressively liberated French companies from rigid
adherence to its own policies and gave executives the
market-based goal of competing successfully and
internationally in their companies' product markets.31 To
enhance financing flexibility, it opened the capital of these
companies to outside investors, with an ambitious
privatization program beginning for two years in 1986 and
resuming in 1993.32 As a result, the State's direct and
indirect ownership of large firms declined.33
If culture matters in firm ownership, a French market
capitalism, similar to that in the U.S., would not
immediately replace State ownership. The State has
created constituencies-not only employees in State-owned
firms who find their jobs threatened by privatization and
ensuing restructuring, but also State bureaucrats who
PRIVATISATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 1, 6 (John Vickers & Vincent Wright
eds., 1989). See also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 18, at 767-69
(describing problems of State ownership, e.g., bureaucrats not focused on
profit-making purpose; State policies (e.g., employment) that may run
counter to specific business success). But see Saul Estrin & Virginie
Protin, Does ownership always matter?, 9 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 55, 62-63
(1991) (describing how the success of firms depends on the definition of
goals); Goldstein, supra note 17, at 459-62 (observing that French State-
owned firms were not all business failures). See also "What the ministry
managed", in A Survey of Business in Europe, EcONOMIsT, Nov. 23, 1996,
at 5-7 (noting that European Union requirements restrict member state
involvement in enterprises and demand the reduction of budget deficits
that are often due to state aid to failing national industries).
" See generally Fanto, supra note 14, at 31-33, 41-46.
32 See generally Goldstein, supra note 17, at 463-74 (pointing out that
indirect privatization also occurred during Socialist control of the French
National Assembly from 1988-1993).
"See OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 1996-1997: FRANCE 111-12 (1997)
(hereinafter, OECD FRANCE) (listing government ownership of stock of
private companies at 3.7%, but observing that this figure does not
include all indirect government ownership); Goldstein, supra note 17, at
475 [identifying government ownership of listed companies (which are
likely to be large firms) at 2%, but with the same reservation about
indirect ownership]. See also Paul Windolf, The Governance Structure of
Large French Corporations: A Comparative Perspective 19 (Mar. 17,
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (observing that the
State controls, with a greater than 50% shareholding, 32 of the 416
largest French firms).
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suffer when the career opportunities provided by State-
owned or controlled companies disappear. These groups can
mobilize resistance to continued privatizations34 and even
join with many French citizens who, as the most recent
French parliamentary elections show, still feel that the
State is the best economic problem solver. 5
Even without the State, ownership in large French firms
is concentrated.36 Families rank significantly among the
concentrated shareholders, which is not surprising since
family ownership of major French firms has been almost as
important a feature of French business as State
ownership.38 Business scholars note that family ownership
did not give way in France, as it did in other countries, to
' See, e.g., A Case of the Dts, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1996, at 19-20;
Privatisation Takes French Leave, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 59-60.
" See Bad for Business?, ECONOMIST, June 7, 1997, at 51 (describing
recent French elections and the possibility that future privatizations will
be delayed or abandoned). See also Fanto, supra note 14, at 57-58
(describing continued State influence in privatized companies).
"' See OECD FRANCE, supra note 33, at 113 (noting that the 1995
weighted average percentage holding of the five largest shareholders of
the 120 nonfinancial companies in a French market index was 48.2% (in
comparison to comparable U.S. figures of 25.4%)). See also Windolf,
supra note 33, at 17-19 (stating that 63% of the firms studied (i.e., 262
out of 416 firms) have a majority shareholder, and 87% (373 firms) have
one shareholder with a holding greater than 25%).
" See Goldstein, supra note 17, at 475 (citing OECD statistics that
indicate household ownership (including through financial
intermediaries) as 34% of listed company stock). See Windolf, supra note
33, at 19 (pointing out that wealthy individuals and families have
controlling stakes (greater than 50%) in 29 companies and significant
stakes (between 10% and 49%) in 56 others), at 18 n.25 (suggesting that
this data understates family ownership, since many families own shares
through control of non-financial companies), at 19 (observing that non-
financial companies own controlling stakes in 59 companies).
3, See BAUER, supra note 18, at 51-120 (describing family ownership
tradition); Windolf, supra note 33, at 15-16. See also Morton Keller,
Regulation of Large Enterprise: The United States Experience in
Comparative Perspective, in MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 161,
164 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Herman Daems eds., 1980) (describing the
primacy of family ownership of firms even in 19th century France).
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specialized management and market capitalism,39 but
families developed members as future managers, recruited
talented managers from the outside (including from the
State) and undertook restructuring through family
relationships.4 0 Yet family firms need the same capital
market financing as do other firms in current economic
circumstances.
French financial institutions have also been important
owners of French firms, but they have not generally been
controlling shareholders;41 rather, they have served as
proxies for the State or as financial advisors to a controlling
shareholder, be it the State or a family.4 2 Financial
institutions, however, have figured in the complex cross-
shareholdings of French privatized companies, known as
"les noyaux durs," that the State helped create by private
sales accompanying a public sale during a large firm's
" See Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Control and Executive
Compensation in Large French Companies, 24 J. L. & Soo'y 85, 88
(1997); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. & Herman Daems, Introduction, in
MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF
THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 1, 7 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. &
Herman Daems eds., 1980).
" See OECD FRANCE, supra note 33, at 127 (listing good results of
family-controlled companies, such as LVMH, L'Oreal, Carrefour,
Castorama). See also Alcouffe & Alcouffe, supra note 39, at 88, 90
(observing that French corporate groups, the control of which
predominantly rests with groups of family shareholders, can respond
rapidly to market and technological changes).
41 See Goldstein, supra note 17, at 475 (listing financial institution
ownership as approximately 20%); OECD FRANCE, supra note 33, at 111
(showing that financial institutions owned 7.8% of total common stock as
of 1994). See also Windolf, supra note 33, at 19 (noting that financial
institutions are controlling shareholders in only 48 out of 416 companies
in his database). Legal obstacles keep financial institution holdings at a
noncontrolling level (e.g., banks are generally limited to holding 10% of
any nonfinancial company, and insurance and mutual funds to 5%). See
Goldstein, supra note 17, at 477.
" See Goldstein, supra note 17, at 475-76; OECD FRANCE, supra note
33, at 111, 125; Windolf, supra note 33, at 16. Cf MICHEL ALBERT,
CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME 117-92 (1991), and OLIVIER PASTRP,
LES NOUVEAUX PILIERS DE LA FINANCE 101-31 (1992) (both arguing that
French financial institutions should take on a more active ownership
role).
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privatization." These networks, which involve from 20 to
40% of a company's equity, insulate company management
and company employees from capital market, and even
product market, pressures and free management from
accountability to shareholders in companies where no
controlling shareholder exists, with ultimately adverse
consequences for the firm."5
Yet the number of capital market investors in large
French firms has been increasing. 6 This is not surprising as
market capitalism also has a French history. 7 Foreign
investors in these -companies, unless controlling
shareholders or part of pan-European cross-shareholding
4 See FRANCOIS MORnI & CLAUDE Dupuy, LE COEUR FINANCIER
EUROP2EN 46-54 (1993); Frangois Morin, Le r~gle capitaliste entre laxisme
et d~tournement, in RAPPORT MORAL SUR L'ARGENT DANS LE MONDE 1996
207, 210-11 (1996).
" See Vi6not Report, supra note 11, at 14-15 (suggesting that
networks will disappear when French companies can raise more equity
capital from French and non-French investors). See also Pastr6, supra
note 23, at 203 (noting that networks permit "consensual" restructuring).
" See generally Frangois Morin, Privatisation et ddvolution des
pouvoirs: Le modle frangais du gouvernement DENTREPRISE, RtvUE
ECONOMIQUE 1253, 1263-66 (Nov. 1996). On the inevitable and
sometimes destructive discipline of product markets, see Jensen, supra
note 10, at 850-51. See OECD FRANCE, supra note 33, at 125-26 (noting
that French privatized companies have recently been the least profitable
of large French firms).
" See Raghuran G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know about
Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data, 50 J. FIN.
1421, 1448 (1995) (finding approximately 50% growth in stock market
capitalization since 1986), at 1432, 1439 (observing that, from 1984 to
1991, the external financing of French companies, although low as a
fraction of total financing, was primarily through equity sales). See also
COMMISSION DES OP2RATIONS DE BOURSE, RAPPORT Au PRtSIDENT DE LA
RtPUBLIQUE ET AU PARLEMENT 1996 42, 63 (1996) (listing increase in
stock market capitalization for the last 5 years and growth in the
number of capital market investors).
47 See ADAMS, supra note 12, at 249-54; Keller, supra note 38, at 164.
See also William N. Goetzmann & Philippe Jorion, A Century of Global
Stock Markets 19 (Dec. 1996) (unpublished paper, on file with author)
(describing active market periods in France).
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1998
CORPORATE LAWAND FRENCH ENTERPRISES
networks,48 are also capital market investors, often from
countries with strong traditions of market capitalism.49
Since the State cannot meet the retirement needs of an
aging population within European Union budget
restrictions, private pension funds will soon be additional
players in the French capital markets."° An important
question regarding French enterprise adaptation is how
French corporate law facilitates firms' access to capital
market investors in the circumstances of State influence,
family ownership and the new management power arising
from cross-shareholder networks.
IV. FRENCH CORPORATE LAW IN
ENTERPRISE ADAPTATION
For at least the past two decades, French legal policy-
makers have created a French corporate law that
contributes to enterprise adaptation by producing a legal
environment favorable to capital market financing. These
efforts focus primarily, but not exclusively, on securities
law. Since laws developed for market capitalism are Anglo-
American (because Anglo-American corporate finance
generally involves raising money from capital market
investors),5 1 Anglo-American legal traditions often inspired
French legal policy-makers.52
48 See Goldstein, supra note 17, at 475 (showing that foreigners own
20% of listed French firms); OECD FRANCE, supra note 33, at 111 (lists
total ownership of common stock by foreigners at 11.1% as of 1994);
Windolf, supra note 33, at 19 (data suggesting that foreign shareholder
was a 75% shareholder in 72 firms).419 See Fanto, supra note 14, at 22-28.
0 See CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, WORKING PARTY
REPORT No. 12, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 29-30 (1995).
"' See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 78-82 (Transaction Publishers,
Murray L. Weidenbaum & Mark Jensen, int., reprinted 1991) (classic
statement on U.S. market capitalism).
5 La Porta et al. conclude that French law has not promoted capital
market financing, because it does not protect investors' rights, see supra
note 5, at 27, and base this conclusion upon a few features of corporate
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While laying the necessary legal groundwork for French
market capitalism, the legal policy-makers accomplished
the easier task. They did not have to face the difficult issue
of the potential incompatibility of French corporate
ownership traditions and a still Statist corporate law with
market capitalism. In short, many parties favored, or did
not strongly oppose, market capitalism and the basic legal
reforms necessary to implement it. This is not to denigrate
the significant efforts of French legal policy-makers, but to
recognize them as only a first step in the law's contribution
to enterprise adaptation.53
A few examples show that legal reforms are recent and
favor capital market investing.54 The primary French
securities market regulator, the Commission des
Op6rations de Bourse (the "COB"), came into existence in
1967, with the mission of regulating and policing market
transactions, such as stock offerings and trading."5 Its
powers to deal with market abuses (e.g., failure of a
company to comply with disclosure requirements) that, if
unaddressed, could undermine market capitalism, however,
resulted only from major legal reforms in 1988 and 1989.6
law without considering securities law developments. See id., at 12-13.
Yet securities laws, which protect capital market investors, are part of
corporate law in France. Through its legal directives, the European
Union also pushes its members to produce a legal environment friendlier
to capital market investing. See Fanto, supra note 14, at 46-48.
A general consensus on the need for market capitalism muted the
conflict between those who had expertise in the finance and legal
techniques of market capitalism and those whose skills lay in
administering State enterprises. See also Yves Dezalay, Between the
State, Law, and the Market: The Social and Professional Stakes in the
Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena 14-20 (Jan. 27, 1995)
(unpublished paper on file with author) (noting that the new legal and
financial expertise was developed within the State).
For a general work on developments in French corporate (including
securities) law, see MAURICE COZIAN & ALAIN VIANDIER, DROIT DES
SOCI9TES (9th ed. 1996).
55 See C. Soc., Ordonnance N' 67-833 du 28 septembre 1967, art. 1
(Fr.).
"
6 Two legal reforms, the Loi N ° 88-70 du 22 janvier 1988 and the Loi
N ° 89-531 du 2 aofit 1989, significantly increased the oversight,
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Two other market authorities, successors to earlier self-
regulatory organizations and regulators of stock exchange
participants (e.g., brokers and listed companies), the
Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs (now renamed the Conseil
des March6s Financiers ("CMF"), by Loi 96-597 du 2 juillet
1996), and the Soci4t6s de Bourses Frangaises, were also
established in 1988 and saw their powers extended in
matters such as broker regulation, listing procedures and
tender offers.57
The basic legal foundations of market capitalism
accompanied the creation and empowerment of market
authorities. On company disclosure, which addresses the
fundamental information disparity between investors and
management, the same law that created the COB also
requires companies making public offers of their securities
or listing them on an exchange to provide information on
their operations in a prospectus (note d'information) in
accordance with COB rules and with the document subject
to COB review and pre-approval.58 The COB also developed
(and constantly refines) a system of continuous reporting
based upon a company reference document (document de
r~frrence) used for listing and as an annual report. 9
Important in any company reporting are financial accounts,
which reflect a company's past operations, and their
accuracy. In France, an official company auditor (the
commissaire aux comptes °) verifies a firm's financial results
investigatory and enforcement powers of the COB on disclosure and
market manipulation. See generally THIERRY SCHOEN, THE FRENCH STOCK
EXCHANGE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR INVESTORS AND ADVISERS 4-10 (1995);
Leslie Goldman, The Modernization of the French Securities Markets:
Making the EEC Connection, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S227, $237-S245
(1992).
" See generally C. Soc., CMF Rbglement G~n6ral, Arr~t6 du 6 juillet
1988, art. 1, annexe (Fr.).
" See C. Soc., Ordonnance N ° 67-833 du septembre 1967 (as
amended), arts. 6, 7 (Fr.).
"' See COMMISSION DES OPItRATIONS DE BOURSE, 27tME RAPPORT AU
PRtSIDENT 23 (1995).
" See generally C. SoC., Loi N ° 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966, arts. 218-35
(Fr.).
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and internal controls and reports on any problems. French
legal policy-makers substantially modified the law in 1984
to increase the verification responsibilities of the
commissaire and to ensure his or her independence from
management.61 Similarly, in 1983 French corporate law
accommodated capital market investors by allowing a
shareholder to vote par correspondance, and in 1988
detailed rules were instituted regulating the manner of,
and management's conduct regarding, this kind of voting.62
V. A RECENT PROPOSAL ON FRENCH
CORPORATE LAW REFORM
The new laws encouraging French capital market
financing were added to a legal code that, as suggested in
Part II, favored concentrated ownership of enterprises,
particularly by the State. Market capitalism, however, is
incompatible with the State's (or another concentrated
owner's) discretion to use a firm's assets for its own
purposes. If French corporate law is to ensure that capital
market investors remain in French enterprises, legal policy-
makers must eradicate the law's Statist character. Such
reform would counteract the State's continued ability,
despite its lessening ownership of enterprise, to interfere in
businesses and should also check the ability of managers,
free of State oversight in companies without a dominant
shareholder, but with protective noyaux durs, to promote
61 See C. Soc., Loi No 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966, arts. 219-22 (Fr.)
(stating conflict-of-interest rules for commissaires). See also LA PORTA,
supra note 5, Table 7 (noting high quality rating of French accounting).
2 C. Soc., D~cret N° 67-236 du 23 mars 1967 (as amended by D~cret
N' 86-584 du 14 mars 1986 and D~cret N° 88-55 du 19 janvier 1988), art.
131-1 et seq (Fr.). See COZIAN & VIANDIER, supra note 54, at 310
(observing that, prior to these reforms, a shareholder could give his or
her vote to a spouse or to another shareholder, or simply provide a
"blank" power to management). See also Joel Chernoff, Shareholder
power grows: France's first proxy solicitations are big step forward, PENS.
& INv., June 10, 1996, at 19 (describing initial proxy solicitation efforts
in France); LA PORTA, supra note 5, at 16-17, Table 1 (importance of laws
governing shareholder voting for promoting market capitalism).
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their own interests over those of shareholders. Finally, any
corporate law reform favoring capital market financing
would have to give investors confidence that the law
addresses potential abuses from the controlling family
shareholders important in French firms and may even
erode such shareholders' dominance.
It thus makes sense to consider briefly whether a recent
proposal for legal reform, the Marini Report,63 would result
in the necessary changes to French corporate law. In effect,
the Report is a positive contribution to the debate over
French corporate law reform because it proposes to
eliminate the Statist aspects of corporate law and because
it advocates an "adaptive" purpose for this law. It observes
that the German influence on the 1966 corporate law
reform supported an "institutional" nature of the
corporation (particularly the large corporation) that
promoted the Statist economic approach and that led to
63 See Marini Report, supra note 11. Another important proposal
concerning legal and other reform of the French board of directors of
listed companies is the Vinot Report, see supra note 11, which was
written at the direction of private associations of companies, but at the
encouragement of the State, and which generated numerous articles in
France on the need for legal reform to address corporate governance
issues. See, e.g., Paul Le Cannu, Lggitimitg du pouvoir et efficacitg du
contr6le dans les socigtgs par actions, BULLtIN JoLY 637 (juillet 1995). In
response to the Vidnot Report and the discussions that it stimulated in
France, the former French Prime Minister, Alain Juppd, asked Senator
Marini in early 1996 to conduct a study that would make
recommendations for changes to French corporate law. See, e.g., JEAN-
JACQUEs DAIGRE, ED., LA MODERNISATION DU DROIT DES SOoIATIs:
PREMIkRES R9FLEXION SUR LE RAPPORT MARINI (1996) (initial reactions to
Marini Report by French legal scholars and practitioners).
" See Marini Report, supra note 11, at 5. Cf LA PORTA, supra note 5,
at 19-20 (noting that German corporate law is not especially favorable to
capital market investors). The "institutional" view, exemplified by the
concept of the "intr&t social" (loosely translated as "corporate interest"),
suggests that, because of its legal personality, a corporation has interests
or purposes that are different from, and superior to, those of its
individual stakeholders, including the shareholders. See Claude
Ducouloux-Favard, L'histoire des grandes soci~t~s en allemande, en
France et en Italie, 4 R. I. D. C. 849, 862-67, 871-75 (1992). See generally
COZIAN & VIANDIER, supra note 54, at 175-77. This view clearly
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the rigidity and constraints in the law.65 The Report argues
that this Statist corporate law no longer functions well as
the State recedes from its commanding position in the
capital of large corporations. Not only does the law's rigidity
prevent enterprises from adapting to changing economic
circumstances, but managers, unchecked by the State, can
now use outdated legal concepts strategically to pursue
their own interests, generally at the expense of capital
market investors.66  Because corporate law handicaps
French enterprises in the global capital market
competition, it must be replaced by a law conducive to
capital market investing and thus to enterprise adaptation,
or these firms, and France, will suffer in global markets.67
The Report recommends that French legal policy-makeis
again look to Anglo-Saxon legal traditions for inspiration.68
Following such inspiration would make French corporate
law more contractual, flexible and friendly to capital
market investors.69 Companies and investors should find in
corporate law possibilities of legal relationships that they
supported, and justified; State control of an enterprise and even State
influence on a non-State-owned company's operations, for State-
sympathetic management could identify "corporate interest" with such
non-firm-specific goals as promoting State policies and aims. See COZIAN
& VIANDIER, supra note 54, at 192-93 (discussing court case in which the
concept was used to allow French company to follow French State foreign
policy).
' See Marini Report, supra note 11, at 18 (corporate law "remains
constraining, very strongly marked by public order"). All translations of
the Report are the author's.
66 See id., at 8-9.
67 See id., at 17 (noting that "economic competition equally places in
competition legal systems. From this perspective, the weight and
rigidities of French corporate law constitute a handicap.") (emphasis in
original).
Cf ALBERT, supra note 42, at 7-26 (discussing France as something
of a battleground between the German and Anglo-Saxon approaches to
company management).
69 See Marini Report, supra note 11, at 17 ("These considerations
argue in favor of a simplification and, even more, of a contractualization
[of the law].") (emphasis in original). See also id., at 6 (noting that the
presence of Anglo-Saxon investors in the capital of French companies
adds weight to this reform).
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1998
CORPORATE LAWAND FRENCH ENTERPRISES
can adjust to their circumstances, which would enable the
companies to adapt better to the economic situation facing
them. This approach considers corporate law as enabling,
that is, as providing default rules for the relationship
between shareholders and other corporate parties, and as
occasionally mandatory where it needs to resolve certain
structural abuses in the relationships. 7o
Despite its positive contribution to corporate law reform,
the Marini Report does not adequately address existing
deterrents to French capital market financing. Its weakness
lies ironically in its embrace of the contractual perspective.
The Report recommends reforms to French corporate law
designed to improve the position of capital market
investors, yet declines to make particular reforms
mandatory, or even provide a form of default rules, given its
assessment of the overall French market situation. 71 The
state of affairs calls, however, for a different balance that
would counteract the continuing influence of the State, the
management power implications of the cross-shareholding
networks, and the dominance of non-State owners.
A few examples related to the governance of large firms
show the strengths and weaknesses of the Report. The
Report recommends upgrading the board of directors, which
is the main representative of shareholders in a firm and
whose effectiveness in providing a counterweight to
management and/or a controlling shareholder is critical for
encouraging capital market investing. Legal and informal
board developments in Anglo-American market capitalism
designed to enhance board effectiveness include having a
board separate from management, requiring that a bdard
chairman not be a CEO, and recommending that the board
710 See Marini Report, supra note 11, at 9 ("[The] role of [the law] is
less to prohibit than to permit."). See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw (1991)
(discussing enabling view of corporate law).
7' The default approach means that companies would have the
freedom, but would have to make an effort, to use other than the given
rules. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5
INDus. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 282 (1996).
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mainly be composed of independent directors with a "lead"
independent director representing the others and serving as
a countervailing power to the CEO (if the latter is the
chair).72 While acknowledging that management control is a
problem in France (but while not addressing dominant
shareholder control),7 the Marini Report generally declines
to recommend legal mandatory or default changes to the
board. Like the Vi6not Report, it would give French
businesses as wide a range of statutory choices regarding
board structure and composition as possible, with the
understanding that market forces should push companies
towards the most suitable choices.74
With one exception,75 the imposition of any particular
board structure upon French companies is, in the Report's
view, inconsistent with its contractual approach and not
justified by evidence that one structure is best suited to all
businesses in current economic conditions. 6  French
companies can adopt a two-tiered board, which is already
permitted under French corporate law,77 or have a unitary
board structure. Similarly, the Marini Report declines to
72 See MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 116-21, 143-44,
193-201 (1995) (for a summary of these developments).
See Marini Report, supra note 11, at 39-40.
7" See, e.g., Marini Report, supra note 11, at 42 (discussing
independent directors); Vi~not Report, supra note 11, at 11 (observing
that "the appointment of independent directors corresponds to market
expectations, and is of a nature to enhance the quality of boardroom
debate .... "). The Vi~not Report recommends that, at a minimum, public
companies have two independent directors. See id., at 12.
75 The Report recommends that existing State-owned enterprises
have the two-tiered board structure (i.e., conseil de surveillance and the
directoire) because that would encourage more board independence,
which is necessary for companies that are soon to leave the State sector.
See Marini Report, supra note 11, at 50. The Report thus recognizes that
French companies were privatized without a management control
structure being put in place, which led to managers' abuses of their
power after privatization.76 See also Vi6not Report, supra note 11, at 8-9.
See C. Soc., Loi NO 66-257 du 24 juillet 1966, arts. 89-117 (Fr.), and
C. Soc., Loi NO 66-257 du 24 juillet 1966, arts. 118-152 (Fr.).
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support any statutory requirement that a company have a
certain percentage of, or all, independent directors (i.e.,
those without any interest in the company). It observes that
management directors cannot now dominate a board
because, under present law, they can occupy at most one-
third of the board (not counting employee representatives)."
The Report would increase company flexibility in the
selection of "completely" independent directors only by
recommending the removal of the current legal requirement
that a board member also be a shareholder.79
It is understandable that, given its economically liberal
perspective, the Marini Report leaves board structure and
composition to market forces and individual company
decision, especially since groups, like the Vidnot committee,
are informally advocating that the board include more
independent directors and become more responsive to
shareholders. While reliance upon market forces makes
sense where market capitalism is advanced, it is less
justified - and less likely to promote market capitalism -
where other traditions of ownership and capitalism prevail.
The Report would have been more effective, for example, by
recommending that some features of board structure (e.g.,
number of independent directors on the board) be default
rules that companies and shareholders must expressly
reject in their charters, which would have maintained its
enabling focus while better countering the impediments to
market capitalism." This problem in the Report may reflect
78 See Marini Report, supra note 11, at 41. For the underlying law,
see C. Soc., Loi N° 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966, art. 93 (Fr.).
"' See Marini Report, supra note 11, at 35. For the underlying law,
see C. Soc., Loi N' 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966, art. 95 (Fr.). It also
recommends increasing the number of management-affiliated directors
that an enterprise can have to one-half, rather than one-third, of the
board, Marini Report, supra note 11, at 44, a somewhat surprising
suggestion, given how much French corporate law already favors
management control. The Report does recommend amending French law
to allow a board member other than the PDG to be the board chairman.
See id., at 34.
" See Romano, supra note 71, at 282. Accordingly, some of the
Report's objections to board reform (e.g., that truly independent directors
No. 1:97]
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
either the inability of its drafters, immersed in the French
situation, adequately to recognize the constraints of its
ownership traditions or their awareness of the need to move
gradually to laws favorable to market capitalism because of
likely resistance to any rapid changes.
These few examples cannot do adequate justice to the
Marini Report. 1 It has the great merit of stating the need
for a reformation of the theoretical foundations of a Statist
French corporate law so as to promote market capitalism in
France and thus to facilitate enterprise adaptation. It is
possible to disagree with the Report's specific
recommendations and to feel that it does not adequately
address French ownership structures that conflict with
market capitalism. Yet it is difficult to think of a better
statement of the true purpose of French corporate law
reform-to enhance enterprise adaptation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Article traces how French corporate law helped
large French companies adapt to changing economic
circumstances. It concludes that French corporate law aided
companies in the adaptation, primarily through laws
must be nominated by some body external to the company, but that this
would create dissension in the firm) are beside the point. An independent
director is a pragmatic effort to counteract, through one board device,
management's natural inclination to nominate "fiiendly" directors and to
control them through its information advantages. Both the Vi~not Report
and the* Marini Report would have done better to focus upon
compensation or other arrangements that would have aligned directors
more with capital market investors, not management or controlling
shareholder interests. See Romano, supra note 71, at 284 (discussing the
importance of these arrangements in improving board performance).
"' For more detailed discussion of specific recommendations of the
Report, see generally FANTo, supra note 2; Fanto, supra note 2.
' See, e.g., Marini Report, supra note 11, at 44, 50 (accepting the view
that cross-shareholdings (the noyaux durs) are temporary in France and
thus not recommending that the law prohibit them. It simply urges that
existing cross-shareholdings be adequately disclosed and gradually
eliminated and that the State not establish them in future
privatizations).
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facilitating capital market financing as the State receded
from company ownership. A recent proposal, the Marini
Report, would significantly improve the law's role in
enterprise adaptation by having this goal inspire legal
reform and by eradicating the law's Statist legacy. Yet the
Report does not go far enough to promote capital market
financing since it fails to recognize, or to acknowledge, that
the French traditions of State- economic involvement and of
family ownership, as well as new manager power, demand
more mandatory, or at least default, laws protective of
capital market investors.
While this overview of French corporate law is positive
from the normative perspective, the immediate future of
legal reform is uncertain. The political parties most
favorable to legal reform lost control of the government.'
The recent French elections are just one more example of
the resistance from people who have human and physical
capital invested in solutions no longer suited for changed
circumstances. Although the reasons for the political result
are complex,8' and although the defeat of the French right
owes much to its own failure to pursue legal and other
reforms vigorously,' the triumph of the French left shows
the continued strength of those whose expertise, beliefs and
very existence lie in the State.
The outcome of any social struggle is never certain. The
Article's prediction is, however, that the recent political
outcome is a temporary setback in the ongoing adaptation
of French business to economic circumstances and corporate
law's contribution to this process; legal reform will
eventually proceed." As noted earlier, France is in the
"'See, e.g., The right rejected in France, ECONOMIST, June 7, 1997, at
49 (describing the defeat of the conservative coalition by a leftist coalition
led by the Socialist party).
See Stanley Hoffman, Look Back in Anger, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July
17, 1997, at 45.
See, e.g., Poor France, ECONOMIST, June 7, 1997, at 16.
See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 234 ("inefficiency in the
commercial sector invites its own demise--all the more so as
international competition has become more vigorous"). The current
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European Union that favors the elimination of State
involvement in business, and French enterprises need
capital market financing. Yet, as the elections show,
adaptation to new circumstances does not come easily and
ownership traditions often change slowly. This suggests
that, when the political conditions are again propitious,
French legal policy-makers should not delay corporate law
reform.
French government has continued privatization (e.g., France T61com),
although not as extensively as its predecessor.
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